US Strategy Weekly: Wishful Thinking

Many market commentators are stating that the unwinding of the yen carry trade on August 5^th was not an economic event, did not signal a recession, and is now in the rearview mirror. This would be nice, but it may be wishful thinking.

The August 5^th selloff may not have signaled a recession, and we also characterized it as a liquidity event, but the carry trade unwinding was still significant for many reasons. First, it was triggered by the first rate hike by the Bank of Japan in 17 years and this sparked a sharp reversal in the yen. Both of these represent economic shifts in the global economy, and they are apt to have longer-term implications. Second, the intensity of the decline was the result of leverage that was no longer viable given the shift in interest rates and the yen. This leverage was what helped drive financial securities higher in the past twelve months and this excess “demand” is unlikely to return in the near future. If we are right, without a new bullish catalyst, it may be difficult for equity indices to exceed their 2024 peaks this year.

There has been a lot of focus on the VIX index since the August 5^th sell-off and many well-known strategists are calling the 65 intra-day peak in the index “the third highest in history.” The VIX hitting this “extreme” reading is a reason some believe August 5^th was a major bottom. In truth, the index was created in 1993 (based on the S&P 100 index) and revised in 2003 (based on the S&P 500 index), but the CBOE provides data that goes back to 1986. This historical data is important because it allows us to look at the October 1987 crash as a benchmark for volatility. August 5^th generated a nice jump in the index, but it was far from the third highest in history on either an intra-day or on a closing price basis (even without using the 1987 data!) See page 3. This appears to be another example of wishful thinking by bullish analysts. Moreover, what the history of the VIX index does show is that after a sharp jump in the index, it usually takes time for price volatility to subside.

One concern we have is that when deleveraging like what took place on August 5 occurs, there can be losses in some portfolios that, in time, could prove to be unmanageable. For example, when Russia defaulted on its debt in August 1998, the losses suffered by Long-Term Capital Management, a highly leveraged fixed income hedge fund founded by a former Solomon Brothers bond trader and a Nobel-prize winning economist, led to a government-sponsored bailout in September 1998. LTCM’s struggle was not widely known for weeks. The fact that the equity market has recovered much of its recent losses is comforting. Recent losses may have moderated, but they may also be temporary.

In retrospect, a number of extremes appeared in the first half of the year that were troubling. According to a recent S&P Global article, the representation of mega-cap companies in the S&P 500 reached a multi-decade high in March when the cumulative weight of the five largest companies in the S&P 500 hit 25.3%. This level has not been seen since December 1970, a 54-year record.

Additionally, data from the Office of Financial Research (OFR), a department within the Treasury Department, shows hedge funds also touched extremes at the end of the first quarter. Assets of qualifying hedge funds totaled $4.12 trillion as of March, of which the largest were “other” with $1.24 trillion, equity with $1.16 trillion, and multi-strategy funds with $702 billion. The overall borrowing relative to assets (net asset-weighted average ratio) was 1.2 for this universe of funds. See page 4.

Leverage is an important part of the equity market, particularly in a bubble market. And since hedge funds are major users of leverage this OFR data is useful. It shows that macro hedge funds ($172 billion in assets) were the most highly leveraged in March with a net asset-weighted average ratio of 6.5, a record for that category. Relative value funds followed with a ratio of 6.2 and multi-strategy ranked third with a ratio of 4.0 (also a record for that category). Equally important is the pace of borrowing. Net borrowing increased 54% YOY for relative value funds, 34% YOY for multi-strategy funds, and 28% YOY for macro funds. In terms of borrowing, $2.3 trillion was done through prime brokerage, $2.1 through repo borrowing, and $556 billion through other secured borrowing. Although this data is only quarterly and is reported with a delay, it does show that leverage was increasing substantially in the first quarter of this year. See page 5.

In terms of liquidity, the Fed’s balance sheet was $7.23 trillion as of August 7, down nearly $1.8 trillion from its April 2022 peak, and down almost $33 billion from a month earlier. But this has not significantly impacted individual investors since demand deposits, retail money market funds, or small-denomination time deposits all grew slightly in the same period. These accounts, plus “other liquid deposits” sum to $18.6 trillion that currently sit in bank deposits. See page 6. In short, the Fed’s careful quantitative tightening is not changing consumer cash balances, and this is positive for equities. Lowering interest rates, if it takes place in September, would improve investors’ liquidity even more.

The NFIB small business optimism index rose 2.2 points in July, to 93.7, the highest readings since February 2022, or in 2 ½ years. However, this was still the 31^st month below the long-term average of 98. Fewer small businesses indicated that they planned to increase wages in July and 25% noted that inflation is their single most important problem. However, there was an increase in the number of businesses planning to increase inventories and this could help third quarter GDP. See page 7.

Producer price data for July showed final demand inflation was rising only 0.1% month-over-month and 2.2% YOY. This was down from the 2.7% YOY seen in June and received well by the market. However, beneath the surface, we noted that final demand for trade services fell 0.7% YOY, and this calmed prices for the month. Trade indexes measure changes in margins received by wholesalers and retailers. However, final demand services, less trade, transportation, and warehousing, showed prices rising a much more worrisome 4.1% YOY. See page 8.

Technical Update

Last week’s sharp sell-off resulted in the Nasdaq Composite and the Russell 2000 index successfully testing their 200-day moving averages on an intra-day basis. The S&P 500 and Dow Jones Industrial Average are trading well above their 200-day moving averages. But for confirmation, we are watching Microsoft Corp. (MSFT-$414.01) and Amazon.com, Inc. (AMZN-$170.23) which broke below their respective 200-day moving averages last week and are now struggling to stay just above those long-term benchmarks. See page 11.

The 25-day up/down volume oscillator is 2.02, in neutral territory, but recovering, after absorbing a 92% down day on August 5. This followed 90% down days seen on April 12, 2024, February 13, 2024, and December 20, 2023. A 90% up day would suggest the worst of the decline is over; however, the last 90% up day was recorded way back on December 13, 2023. This oscillator failed to reach an overbought reading on the last rally and therefore did not confirm the advance. To date, an uptrend in this oscillator off the 2022 low, remains intact and lends a bullish bias to an otherwise neutral position in this index. Should this trend line be broken it would be a warning sign for the longer-term stock market. See page 12.
Gail Dudack

Click to Download